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Introduction
All the post-Communist states of the former Soviet 
empire have experienced significant change in the last 
twenty years, but Russia's systemic transformations since 
Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika may be most dramatic. 
Most of the East Central European satellite states and 
the Baltic republics moved from some from of decayed 
totalitarianism through generally brief interludes of 
authoritarianism to democracy—and have stayed there. 
Serbia, Croatia, Albania, Macedonia, and Ukraine had 
longer authoritarian interludes, but in the end appear to 
have adopted democratic forms of government. Belarus, 
Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan ended their transitions at different stages of 
authoritarianism; Turkmenistan has arguably remained 
totalitarian; and Kyrgyzstan rushed toward democracy, 
but then fell back to a weak form of authoritarianism.
In contrast to the above, Russia passed from 
totalitarianism to several years of both authoritarianism 
and democracy—only to abandon democracy completely 
and embark on a transition to what is arguably fascism. 
In using this term, I am suggesting both the magnitude of 
Russia's change in recent years and the direction in which 
it has changed. No less important, I am also suggesting 
that the terms scholars have developed for Russia— 
such as patrimonial or tsarist—are inadequate, primarily 
because they fail to place Russia on a spectrum of 
comparative political-system types. This paper therefore 
examines fascism as a system type within a typology of 
political systems. It also suggests why Vladimir Putin's 
Russia has enough of the defining characteristics of 
fascism to qualify as fascistoid—that is, as moving 
toward fascism—and why Russia alone moved along so 
exceptionally turbulent a systemic path. Finally, the paper 
examines whether a fascistoid or fascist Russia is likely 
to be stable.1
A fi nal point about political sensibilities needs 
making. Fascism is often used as an epithet, especially 
by the left, but it actually is, or at least can be, a perfectly 
respectable social-science term that refers to a particular
1. Many thanks to Michael Bernhard, Thomas Bernstein, Yitzhak 
Brudny, Richard Langhorne, Jerzy Mackow, Rajan Menon, and George
Schopflin for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
type of political system. Some Russians may find it 
objectionable that their country, which waged the “Great 
Patriotic War” against fascism, should now be called 
fascist. That is certainly an irony of history, but there 
is no reason that such a reversal of roles should not be 
possible. Democracies (such as Weimar Germany) can 
become dictatorships, and dictatorships (such as Franco 
Spain) can become democracies. If today's Russia 
approximates the definition of fascism, then the fault 
surely lies, not with the scholars who use the term, but 
with the politicians who made it usable.2
Systems and System Types
Social scientists have since Plato and Aristotle 
characterized countries or states according to their 
dominant features, as only such an exercise permits 
them to engage in comparisons and produce theoretical 
generalizations. A political system—a term that I shall, 
despite their conceptual differences, use interchangeably 
with state in this paper—consists of those characteristics 
that define the politics, broadly conceived, of a country.3 
Those characteristics concern established institutions, 
structures, relations, and attitudes—and not individuals 
or policies. The disassociation of policies from systems 
means that, for instance, democratic systems may conduct 
non-democratic policies and still be democratic systems, 
while authoritarian systems may pursue democratic 
policies and still be authoritarian systems.
The system types that social scientists employ are 
ideal types: that is, few countries or states ever match 
all their requirements exactly. No less important, system 
types, however plausible they may seem at a macro level, 
always break down upon closer inspection of the myriad 
details that comprise the real life of real societies and real 
countries. In other words, system typologies are useful 
only at a fairly high, and thus abstract, level of generality 
(and it is small wonder that they rarely appeal to social
2. There have been self-styled Russian fascists in the twentieth century. 
See John Stephan, The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile, 
1925-1945 (New York: Harper & Row, 1978).
3. For extended discussions of political systems, see Anton Bebler and
Jim Seroka, eds., Contemporary Political Systems (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner, 1990).
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historians, anthropologists, and other scholars similarly 
inclined to examine micro events4). But because system 
types are at such a high level of generality, they enable 
us to outline the contours of systems, trace how they 
are changing, and suggest, however imperfectly, just 
what their future trajectories are likely to be. Plato thus 
argues that his ideal republic will eventually break down, 
while Aristotle believes that democracy as he defines it 
necessarily results in dictatorship. There is no “correct” 
typology or classification. Typologies and classifications 
are “good” as long as they are internally consistent and 
theoretically fruitful.
The three dominant system types encountered in 
modern social-science literature are totalitarianism, 
authoritarianism, and democracy, which differ, to put it 
over-simply, from one another in the degree to which the 
ruling authorities exert control and the society enjoys 
political and economic freedom. Totalitarian systems 
are most controlling and their populations enjoy least 
freedom; democratic systems are least controlling and 
their populations enjoy most freedom; and authoritarian 
systems are somewhere between the two. Obviously, there 
is no system that exerts total control over everything, 
just as there is no system that is perfectly democratic— 
which may mean, ironically, that authoritarianism is the 
least ideal of the system types. Soviet studies employed 
all three categories until about the mid-1960s, when 
totalitarianism was, in an excessive fit of social-historical 
revisionism, consigned to the ash heap of history. It was 
only in the mid- to-late-1980s that totalitarianism again 
became respectable among western Sovietologists, in no 
small measure because Soviet analysts began reviving 
it in order to understand the impact of Gorbachev's 
perestroika on the USSR.5
The systemic types, and their features, that I employ 
in this paper are presented in table 1 (see page 12). 
The categories of totalitarianism, authoritarianism, and 
democracy are relatively straightforward and, I trust, 
uncontroversial and require no further elaboration. The 
fifth column, however, which describes the features of 
fascism, does require a closer look, if only because there 
is little scholarly consensus on what fascism is.6 It is 
important to appreciate that this condition of disagreement 
is hardly unique to fascism. Scholars have yet to find 
common and uncontroversial definitions for any number 
of terms—from state to totalitarianism to culture to 
genocide to revolution to democracy. We still use them,
4. See R.J.B. Bosworth, Mussolini's Italy: Life under the Fascist
Dictatorship, 1915-1945 (New York: Penguin, 2006), p. 566.
5. Giovanni Sartori, “Totalitarianism, Model Mania and Learning from 
Error,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 5, no. 1, 1993, pp. 5-22.
6. For an indication of the diversity of views, see Adrian Lyttelton,
“What Was Fascism?” New York Review of Books, vol. 51, no. 16,
October 21, 2004; Antonio Costa Pinto, “Back to European Fascism,” 
Contemporary European History, vol. 15, no. 1, 2006, pp. 103-115.
because they strike us as important; and we can use them 
well, if we define them well. Others may disagree, but that 
is their prerogative. Obviously, if unanimity of meaning 
were a precondition of a term's being used, then social 
science would cease activity immediately.
Fascism as a Political System
Let us start our investigation of fascism by examining 
five definitions, which nicely illustrate both the diversity 
of opinions and approaches regarding fascism and the 
weaknesses of existing definitions.
• Juan Linz defines fascism as “a hypernationalist, 
often pan-nationalist, anti-parliamentary, anti-
liberal, anti-communist, populist and therefore 
anti-proletarian, partly anti-capitalist and anti-
bourgeois, anti-clerical, or at least, non-clerical 
movement, with the aim of national social 
integration through a single party and corporative 
representation not always equally emphasized; 
with a distinctive style and rhetoric, it relied on 
activist cadres ready for violent action combined 
with electoral participation to gain power with 
totalitarian goals by a combination of legal 
and violent tactics. The ideology and above 
all the rhetoric appeals for the incorporation of 
a national cultural tradition selectively in the 
new synthesis in response to new social classes, 
new social and economic problems, and with 
new organizational conceptions of mobilization 
and participation, differentiate them from 
conservative parties.”7
• According to Robert O. Paxton, “Fascism may 
be defined as a form of political behavior marked 
by obsessive preoccupation with community 
decline, humiliation, or victim-hood and by 
compensatory cults of unity, energy, and purity, 
in which a mass-based party of committed 
nationalist militants, working in uneasy but 
effective collaboration with traditional elite 
groups, abandons democratic liberties and 
pursues with redemptive violence and without 
ethical or legal restraints goals of internal 
cleansing and external expansion.”8
• Michael Mann says that “fascism is the pursuit 
of a transcendent and cleansing nation-statism
7. Juan J. Linz, “Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of Fascism 
in Sociological Historical Perspective,” in Walter Laqueur, ed., 
Fascism: A Reader's Guide (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1976), pp. 12-13.





• Stanley G. Payne writes that “fascism may 
be defined as a form of revolutionary ultra-
nationalism for national rebirth that is based 
on a primarily vitalist philosophy, is structured 
on extreme elitism, mass mobilization, and the 
Fuhrerprinzip, positively values violence as end 
as well as means and tends to normalize war 
and/or the military virtues.”10
• According to Roger Scruton, “Fascism is 
characterized by the following features (not 
all of which need to be present in any of its 
recognized instances): nationalism; hostility to 
democracy, to egalitarianism, and to the values 
of the liberal enlightenment; the cult of the 
leader, and admiration for his special qualities; a 
respect for collective organization, and a love of 
the symbols associated with it, such as uniforms, 
parades, and army discipline.”11
Linz's and Paxton's definitions are, in reality, historically- 
grounded descriptions of movements, and not definitions 
of a system type. Although Linz has a point in emphasizing 
the “anti” character of fascism—if only because the 
definition of any object necessarily entails stating what 
it is not—he underplays the no less important part of 
any definitional exercise—stating what an object is. 
Paxton is surely right to suggest that fascism is a “form 
of political behavior” (what is not a form of political 
behavior?), but that form appears to be primarily rooted 
in a psychological condition characterized by obsessive 
and compensatory attitudes and only secondarily in 
political phenomena. Mann's definition actually is a 
definition, but its emphasis on “pursuit” reduces fascism 
to an activity with a set of goals—a characterization 
that, like Paxton's, applies to most human endeavors 
and has the effect of removing fascism from the realm of 
movements or regimes or systems or, for that matter, even 
politics. Like Mann, Payne provides an actual definition, 
but his differs from the others in reducing fascism to an 
ideology—ultra-nationalism—which tells us little about 
fascism as a system of rule. Scruton's is a list of family 
characteristics that sidesteps the question of whether 
fascism is an ideology, movement, or system, but it does 
have the advantage of being pithy and clear.
Despite these definitional difficulties and
9. Michael Mann, Fascists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), p. 13.
10. Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), p. 14.
11. Roger Scruton, A Dictionary of Political Thought (New York:
Harper & Row, 1982), p. 169.
disagreements, it is noteworthy that Payne's and Scruton's 
defining characteristics overlap, while also resonating 
with many of the points made by Linz, Mann, and 
Paxton. All five scholars more or less agree that fascism 
is hyper-nationalist; anti-democratic; elitist; leader- 
centered; mass-oriented or collectivist; and vitalist. They 
disagree about violence and mass mobilization, with 
Payne and Paxton regarding both as central, and Scruton 
disregarding the former altogether and only hinting at the 
latter with his reference to collective organization and 
parades. Note also their points of disagreement with Linz. 
Payne, Paxton, Mann, and Scruton say nothing about 
fascism's supposedly anti-capitalist, anti-bourgeois, anti-
communist, or anti-proletarian qualities.
These definitions point to three conclusions. First, 
we need to differentiate between fascist systems and 
fascist movements. Although they may share similar 
ideological goals and aspirations, political systems are 
established sets of institutions, structures, relations, and 
attitudes, while movements are mass organizations that 
are “on the move.” Since fascist movements are far more 
numerous than fascist systems, most scholars defining 
fascism are actually defining fascist movements and 
not fascist systems.12 But, obviously, there is no reason 
for the two political formations to share the same exact 
characteristics. Violence and mass mobilization, for 
instance, can easily be defining features of movements, 
especially of revolutionary movements committed to 
overthrowing an established order. Indeed, one could 
argue that such movements, whether on the right or on 
the left, have to be violent and have to mobilize their 
followers if they want to achieve their goals. Systems, 
in contrast, even highly repressive systems, generally 
employ violence and mass mobilization only in spurts, 
if only because violence and mobilization are, by their 
very nature, too disruptive of the institutionalized quality 
of all systems, even repressive ones. Thus, Stalin's, 
Hitler's, and Mao Zedong's versions of totalitarianism 
employed violence and mobilized populations only at 
particular times. Eventually terror and mobilization had 
to be reined in, because they threatened to destroy their 
initiators and upend institution-building. In that sense, 
real totalitarianism is totalitarianism without terror and 
without mass mobilization—or what the Soviet Union 
and China became after, respectively, Stalin's death and 
the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
Second, we must appreciate that why fascist systems 
emerge is a question of causality and that the origins of 
things should not be confused with the characteristics, 
or definitions, of those things. In other words, it is 
perfectly possible for similar or identical fascist systems 
to be “caused” by different factors at different times. The
12. See Ernst Nolte, Die faschistischen Bewegungen (Munich: 
Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1966).
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“anti” qualities emphasized by Linz reflect the historical 
origins of inter-war fascisms and tell us more about 
causation than about system type. There is thus no reason 
to expect early-twenty-first century fascisms to have the 
same causes as twentieth-century fascisms. Just as there 
are many causes of nationalism, war, revolution, empire, 
and so on, so too there may be many causes of fascism.
And third, we need to dissociate the particular 
characteristics of particular historical fascisms from the 
defining characteristics of fascism as a system type. In 
the first case, there is no need to be especially rigorous 
about how systemic categories vary across systems (such 
as totalitarianism, authoritarianism, democracy, and 
fascism) because the focus is on some country at some 
time; in the latter case, that kind of rigorous, controlled, 
cross-systemic comparison is the very point of the whole 
exercise. We cannot expect every example of fascism 
to be identical in every single respect to every other 
example of fascism. Nor should we think that every 
case of fascism must be identical to the Italian variant.13 
(Surely, fascist leaders need not all be named Benito 
Mussolini, and fascists need not speak Italian.) Our 
goal should be to grasp those defining and associated 
features of fascism that define it on its own terms and in 
relation to other system types. And that means that we 
can only define fascism as a system type in comparison 
to other political system types, such as totalitarianism, 
authoritarianism, and democracy. It is only through a 
sustained and rigorous across-the-board comparison of 
the defining characteristics of these systems that we can 
begin to distinguish fascism from the others and get a 
better grasp of what it is. Table 1 attempts to do just that.
Totalitarianism, Authoritarianism, 
and Fascism
Unlike democracies, fascist systems lack meaningful 
parliaments, judiciaries, parties, political contestation, 
and elections. The key word here is meaningful: in fascist 
systems, as in all authoritarian or totalitarian systems, 
parliaments are rubber-stamp institutions, judiciaries 
do what the leader tells them, opposition parties are 
marginal, and electoral outcomes are preordained. Unlike 
totalitarian states, fascist states do not penetrate into every 
dimension of a country's political, economic, social, and 
cultural life; fascist states do not propound all-embracing
13. Consider Zeev Sternhell's comment: “Fascism in power was 
something to which fascist parties made remarkably different 
contributions, depending on the country concerned. Every country 
where there was a fascist party had peculiarities duly reflected in its 
local political organizations; nevertheless, where a so-called fascist 
regime came into being, these national features usually became even 
more exaggerated. Thus movements have much more in common than 
regimes.” (“Fascist Ideology,” in Laqueur, Fascism A Reader's Guide, 
p. 318.)
ideologies that purport to answer all of life's questions. 
Instead, like all authoritarian states, fascist states attempt 
only to influence and control these dimensions of life and 
they prefer to espouse limited worldviews.
Like authoritarian systems, fascist systems are 
highly centralized and hierarchical, they give pride 
of place within the authority structure to soldiers and 
policemen, usually secret policemen, and they always 
have a domineering party that, in contrast to the single 
hegemonic party of totalitarian systems, may tolerate 
other parties but that, in contrast to the dominant parties 
characteristic of authoritarian systems, brooks no 
interference in its running of the political system. Like 
authoritarian states, fascist states limit freedom of the 
press, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly. Like 
authoritarian states, fascist states also reject socialism 
and embrace capitalism—which means that they tacitly 
acknowledge private property and the autonomy of 
capitalists. But this autonomy is circumscribed by 
substantial state intervention—ranging from simple 
dirigisme to occupation of the strategic heights to 
corporatism. And like authoritarian states, fascist states 
generally espouse some form of hyper-nationalism 
glorifying their nation and its fabulous past, present, and 
future. But fascist states also go further than authoritarian 
states in fetishizing the state and its glory and power.
Like totalitarian systems, fascist systems always 
have a supreme leader enjoying cult-like status. Run- 
of-the-mill authoritarian states typically connote images 
of dour old men ruling a sullen population. Totalitarian 
states generally connote images of wise patriarchs. 
Fascist leaders, in contrast, exude vigor and want to 
appear youthful, manly, and active. These qualities of 
hyper-masculinity are most starkly evident in such fascist 
and fascistoid leaders as Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, 
Juan Peron, and Hugo Chavez, but they are lacking in 
such totalitarian and authoritarian autocrats as Joseph 
Stalin, Francisco Franco, Augusto Pinochet, Nicolae 
Ceausescu, or the Ayatollah Khomeini. A fascist leader 
may, like Mussolini, fit the historical stereotype and be 
hyper-masculine and histrionic or, like Putin, he may not 
and instead be hyper-masculine and cool.14
Fascist leaders also evoke and appeal to vitalism and 
vigor in the population and usually coopt the young into 
their movements or parties. No less important, fascist 
states are popular and they always implicate the population 
in its own repression. Fascist states incorporate the 
population into the system of rule, promising it a grand 
and glorious future in exchange for its enthusiasm and 
support. Fascist leaders are especially popular, presenting 
themselves as the embodiments of a nation's best
14. This point does raise the question of whether fascist leaders can be 
women and, if so, just what sort of leader style they would have to 
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qualities and as the only hopes for its future. It is small 
wonder, therefore, that fascist and totalitarian systems are 
often characterized by parades and flag-waving. (Russia's 
decision in January 2008 to revive the May 9th military 
parades on Red Square was therefore quite significant.) 
But pace Scruton, parades are not defining characteristics 
of either system—indeed, it would be bizarre if something 
that ephemeral were—but associated characteristics of 
such systems' populist nature.
The above similarities to and differences from 
totalitarianism and authoritarianism suggest that we 
may hazard a definition. I therefore define fascism as a
non-democratic, non-socialist political system with a 
domineering party, a supreme leader, a hyper-masculine
leader cult, a hyper-nationalist, statist ideology, and an 
enthusiastically supportive population.15 *The elements
15. Note how similar this definition is to one developed by Payne in
1980, when he concluded Fascism: Comparison and Definition 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), p. 211, with a list of 
the “key features” that “reemerge in radical movements and national
of the typology in table 1 that are not found in my 
definition—such as pro-regime movement, police/army, 
media/society, and violence—can be dealt with in one 
of three complementary ways. The presence of a pro-
regime movement, the prominence of police and army 
cadres, and the employment of violence may be more 
appropriately considered the defining characteristics 
of fascist movements that are carried over into fascist 
systems. Alternatively, these elements may be considered 
associated characteristics that can logically be derived 
from the central defining characteristics. Thus, the quality
authoritarian regimes in later times and other regions, even the the 
profile of the new groups is on balance distinct from the generic 
European fascicsms.” These features are: “(1) permanent nationalistic 
one-party authoritarianism, neither temporary nor a prelude to 
internationalism; (2) the charasmatic leadership principle, incorporated 
by many communist and other regimes as well; (3) the search for a 
synthetic ethnicist ideology, distinct from liberalism and Marxism; (4) 
an authoritarian state system and political economy of corporatism or 
syndicalism or partial socialism, more limited and pluralistic than the 
communist model; (5) the philosophical principle of voluntaristic 
activism, unbounded by any philosophical determinism.”
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of being non-democratic implies some dominance by the 
army and police, the domination by the state of the media 
and society, and the willingness to employ violence. And 
a leader cult combined with popular support implies 
a pro-leader movement. Last, as already noted above, 
violence—whether selective or widespread—may be 
considered a policy stance and not a system characteristic, 
a claim that clearly contradicts the view that war is the 
“essence” of fascism.
As this definition suggests, fascism appears to 
share some characteristics of totalitarianism and some 
of authoritarianism. Like totalitarian systems, fascist 
systems have cults of the leader, enjoy widespread 
popular support, and have pro-regime movements. Like 
authoritarian systems, fascist systems have dominant 
parties, rigged elections, and rubber-stamp parliaments, 
promote ideologies of statism and hyper-nationalism, 
control market economies, incorporate the army and secret 
police within the ruling elite, and dominate the media 
and society. At the same time, fascism differs from both 
totalitarianism and from authoritarianism in significant 
ways. By virtue of being non-socialist, fascist systems 
will always fall short of fully totalitarian systems. And 
by virtue of having hyper-masculine cults of supreme 
leaders and domineering parties, fascist systems differ 
from authoritarian systems.
Is fascism therefore a separate system type? Is it a 
cross-between authoritarianism and totalitarianism? Is it 
a peculiar form of authoritarianism—one with a specific 
type of leader, leader cult, and party? Or is it a peculiar 
form of totalitarianism—one without socialist aspirations? 
There is no correct answer to these questions. I treat 
fascism as a separate system type, but one could just as 
easily adopt any of the alternatives.16 Scholars yearning 
for certitude will be unhappy with this conclusion and 
may decide that conceptual clarity is therefore pointless, 
but they would be failing to appreciate that all theorizing, 
while unavoidably linked to and enriched by conceptual 
distinctions, is also, and always, limited by those same 
distinctions.
Russia's Systemic Transformations
Russia has experienced at least three systemic 
transformations in the last two decades. It moved from 
totalitarianism to authoritarianism in the late 1980s and 
from authoritarianism to democracy in the early 1990s. 
It then remained a weakly democratic state until the 
early 2000s, when, under President Putin's tutelage, it 
began to move toward fascism—a process that, for all 
its progress, has not yet culminated in a full-fledged,
16. One difference is clear, however: namely, that fascism, at least as I 
have defined it, is necessarily different from communist totalitarian-
ism.
consolidated fascism. As I suggest later in this paper, a 
fourth transformation may soon be in store, as fascism 
contains within it several disintegrative tendencies that 
are likely to produce system breakdown in the not too 
distant future.
The story begins in 1985, when Gorbachev became 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union. The country had just emerged from over three 
decades of post-Stalinist change. State terror had been 
abandoned in the early 1950s, but the system of total 
control built by Stalin remained essentially in place.17 That 
it began to malfunction seriously by the 1970s bespoke a 
weakening, or decay, of the totalitarian system, but not 
its replacement by something else.18 Totalitarianism's 
decay appears to have been the inevitable consequence 
of over-centralization; totalitarianism's collapse, as Karl 
Deutsch suggested in the 1950s, would probably have 
been inevitable as well.19 What Gorbachev effectively did 
by introducing glasnost and perestroika was to determine 
the timing of that collapse
Perestroika aimed to revive the Soviet Union but 
succeeded in liberating the media and society from 
total Party domination, destroying the centrally planned 
economy and Communist Party hegemony, and ushering 
in, by 1989-1990, an unstable authoritarian system of 
rule in the USSR. The Party remained the dominant 
force even after its constitutionally-enshrined “leading 
role” was abandoned in early 1990, although the 1989 
elections to the Congress of People's Deputies and the 
1990 elections to the republic Supreme Soviets were 
more or less competitive and the resultant legislatures 
became more than rubber-stamp institutions. Gorbachev 
was still the strong man, though getting increasingly 
weaker by the day as Boris Yeltsin increased his power 
base in Russia; the population acquiesced in, without 
being enthusiastic about, Gorbachev's rule; the media 
and society, though strikingly freer, were still dominated 
by the Party and state; repression had become decidedly 
selective; and the army and KGB still played a large 
role in the ruling elites. With the Soviet economy and 
Communist ideology in shambles, it would be hard 
to speak of anything resembling a state alliance with 
dominant market forces or of an overarching ideology of 
statism or hyper-nationalism.
This imperfect form of authoritarianism lasted in 
Russia for about two to three years, until the failed coup
17. See Jerzy Mackow, Totalitarismus und danach (Baden-Baden:
Nomos, 2005).
18. Janos Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of 
Communism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp.
360-378.
19. See Karl Deutsch, “Cracks in the Monolith: Possibilities and 
Patterns of Disintegration in Totalitarian Systems,” in Harry Eckstein 
and David E. Apter, eds., Comparative Politics: A Reader (New York: 
Free Press, 1963), pp. 497-508.
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attempt of August 19-21, 1991 and Yeltsin's subsequent 
accession to power, when Russia's political system 
began moving more decisively toward democracy. The 
system built by Yeltsin was deeply flawed—the bombing 
of the Duma in late 1993 was anything but democratic 
and the manipulation of the presidential elections of 
1996 was scandalous—but it was democratic. Russia 
did have multiple parties, genuine elections, and an 
autonomous parliament. Its leader was the president, and 
not some charismatic man on horseback. The dominant 
ideology rested on notions of popular sovereignty, and 
not on statism or hyper-nationalism. The economy was 
becoming increasingly market-oriented and state control 
was weakening, not increasing. Popular support was 
at best lukewarm; pro-regime mass movements were 
absent; representatives of the military and secret police— 
the notorious siloviki—were only just beginning to seep 
into the ruling structures; the media and society were 
more or less free; and repression was minimal. Crime, 
corruption, and violence from below were rampant, but 
those were not features of the system per se. Yeltsin's 
system also had elements of authoritarianism, and it was 
characterized by an extensive blurring of lines of authority 
between and among ministries and regions, thereby 
creating the impression, if not reality, of chaos. But, in 
the final analysis, Yeltsin's Russia was not quite hybrid— 
if by that is meant a system that is equally democratic and 
equally authoritarian—but rather imperfectly democratic, 
that is, a democracy with substantial elements of 
authoritarianism.20
As soon as Putin became president in 2000, a move 
away from Yeltsin-style democracy quickly became 
evident. In Lilia Shevtsova's words, “In 2000-2001 
the new Russian leader practically began refashioning 
the Yeltsin regime by taking apart its most important 
building blocks. Instead of the Yeltsin principle of 
mutual connivance, shadowy checks and balances, 
tolerance for opposition, and the maintenance of power 
by redistributing and decentralizing it and provoking 
constant revolutionary shocks, Putin turned to the 
principle of subordination, hierarchical submission, 
quelling opposition, control over alternative ways of 
thinking of the elite, and centralization of the federation. 
In essence, Putin began to build a ‘conveyer belt' political 
regime.”21
Eight years later, Russia had moved decisively
20. There is another reason, at least in retrospect, to consider Yeltsin's 
Russia more democratic than authoritarian. If Yeltsin's Russia is the 
former, then Putin's changes represent systemic discontinuity; if 
Yeltsin's Russia is the latter, then Putin's changes represent systemic 
continuity.
21. Lilia Shevtsova, “Political Leadership in Russia's Transformation,” 
in Alexander J. Motyl, Blair A. Ruble, and Lilia Shevtsova, eds.,
Russia's Engagement with the West (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005),
p. 100.
away from any reputable definition of democracy 
(“managed” or “sovereign” democracy obviously does 
not count) and toward what I term fascism. By late 2008, 
democratic institutions were at best moribund, having 
been transformed into pliant tools of the Kremlin; the 
party of power, United Russia, dominated the political 
scene, even if its members were rarely fanatics of the kind 
often encountered in fascist movements; civil society 
and the press were severely circumscribed; the siloviki 
dominated all ruling elites and suffused them with their 
antidemocratic ethos; the state promoted capitalism 
while making sure to command its strategic heights by 
means of controlling key industries, especially in energy, 
defense, mining, and manufacturing; the Russian state 
was unabashedly glorified to the point of representing a 
genuine fetish; despite the election of Dmitri Medvedev 
as president in the spring of 2008, Prime Minister Putin 
remained the undisputed “national leader,” and his 
image exuded vigor, youth, and manliness22; a variety of 
rabidly pro-Putin youth groups—with Nashi as the most 
celebrated example—acted as the vanguard of the leader; 
the population overwhelmingly supported Putin, and 
had done so since he assumed the presidency; a growing 
mistrust of both internal and external foreigners and a 
corresponding glorification of Russia's past (including 
its criminal Stalinist period) and present were the official 
worldview.
Is Putin's Russia Fascist?
Of all these factors, the defining characteristics of 
fascism—the non-democratic and non-socialist nature 
of Russia's political system, the hyper-nationalist, statist 
ideology, the hyper-masculine cult of the supreme leader, 
and the enthusiastically supportive population—are 
central to our enquiry. I consider these briefly in turn.
• Non-democratic and non-socialist political system:
Elections to the Duma and presidency are generally 
regarded as unfair and unfree—even though almost 
everyone agrees that Putin and his allies would 
win even if elections were fair and free. (This 
seeming paradox is resolved easily enough when 
one remembers that Putin and his comrades are 
not democrats and have no need of democracy.) 
By the same token, the Duma has been effectively 
transformed into a rubber-stamp parliament, partly 
as a result of changes to its structure and procedures 
and mostly as a result of the dominance within it, and 
the larger political system, of the pro-presidential
22. For an analysis of Putin's relationship with Medvedev, see Amy 
Knight, “The Truth about Putin and Medvedev,” New York Review of
Books, May 15, 2008, pp. 11-14.
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party of power, United Russia. To be sure, United 
Russia does not resemble twentieth-century fascist 
movements striving for power. The former is a 
loose agglomeration of mostly opportunists who 
boarded a regime-sponsored political band wagon; 
the latter were, like the Bolsheviks, cadre parties of 
true believers. A more apposite comparison would 
be with the Nazis or Fascists in power, by which 
time their ranks had been swelled by hangers-on and 
careerists and both had become popular container 
parties that only slightly resembled the militant 
movements from which they had sprung. At the 
same time, United Russia clearly does not—or does 
not yet—dominate all of Russia's political, social, 
economic, and cultural institutions and, in that sense, 
falls far short of the reality in Hitler's Germany or 
Mussolini's Italy. The claim that post-Soviet Russia 
is non-socialist requires, I trust, no elaboration.
• Stctism and hyper-nationalism: Although Russia 
lacks a coherent ideology of the sort encountered 
in the Soviet Union, fascist Italy, or Nazi 
Germany, the prevailing ideological currents, or 
discourse, clearly promote and glorify both the 
Russian state and the Russian people. The concept 
of “sovereign democracy”, for instance, is about 
a strong Russian state, and not about democracy. 
Especially emblematic of this discourse is 
Putin's 2007 “Speech at the Reception on the 
Occasion of National Unity Day”, in which he 
emphasized the indivisible relationship between 
national unity, national greatness, and state 
strength.23 Unlike Mussolini and Hitler, whose 
style was histrionic and whose language was 
often bombastic, Putin usually comes across as 
cool and collected. Notwithstanding the style,
23. “On this very day a long time ago, in 1612, at the foot of the 
Kremlin's walls we celebrated more than simply a victory over foreign 
invaders. Thanks to the unity displayed by the multinational people of 
Russia we managed to end the many years of troubles and internal 
strife. It was the way Russian society rallied together and the 
responsibility it took for the country's destiny that allowed us to 
defend our independence and renew Russian statehood. We created the 
conditions to construct and establish an enormous great power, 
stretching from the Baltic to the Pacific Ocean. Without a doubt, 
authentic patriotic actions by Russian citizens have constituted the 
might and power of our people over many centuries. They have 
promoted unfailing spiritual values that are transferred to generation
from generation.... Modern Russia is strong not only because of its
new economic successes or its growing influence in international
affairs. Russia was and remains powerful thanks to national unity and, 
of course, thanks to the tremendous intellectual and creative potential 
of our people, talented, qualified people who sincerely desire to act for 
the benefit of their nation. This is the best bridge to the successful 
future of Russia, to reviving and strengthening our country's historic 
role.” <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/11/04/0924_ 
type127286_150361.shtml>.
Putin's message of state greatness differs little 
from that of other fascist leaders. Russia's official 
ideology of nationalism, meanwhile, does fall 
short of the style and substance of Mussolini's or 
Hitler's extreme claims. Accordingly, Russians 
are great, as are their past and present and 
future, but—aside from official toleration and 
encouragement of Russian superciliousness 
toward other non-Russians—that greatness does 
not yet entail racism and overt ethnocentrism.24 
On the other hand, Russia's unofficial discourse 
of nationalism has witnessed the mainstreaming 
of such ultranationalists and fascists as Aleksandr 
Dugin, Aleksandr Prokhanov, Dmitri Rogozin, 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and Moscow Mayor Yuri 
Luzhkov.25 It is surely indicative of both great- 
power and ultra-nationalist rhetoric that Putin 
on March 8, 2008 called Medvedev a “Russian 
nationalist”—in the presence of, of all people, 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Even though 
Putin insisted that he meant that “in the good 
sense of the word,” he could not have not known 
that his use of the term was a slap in the face of 
German discursive sensibilities.26
• Hyper-masculine cult of supreme leader: Like 
Mussolini, Putin favors stylish black clothing 
that connotes toughness and seriousness.27 Like 
Mussolini, Putin likes being photographed in 
the presence of weapons and other instruments 
of war. And like Mussolini, Putin likes to show 
off his presumed physical prowess. The specially 
released late-2007 pre-electoral video showing 
Putin in a variety of manly poses—on horseback, 
with automatic rifles, wading through a river— 
and usually bare-chested deserves particular 
attention and arguably represents a watershed 
in Putin's self-representation.28 Not only is the 
video extraordinary in its blatant depiction of
24. Note Schopflin's comment: “The rise of a fairly unpleasant brand 
of chauvinist nationalism in Russia has two consequences. It makes all 
things non-Russian inherently suspect and makes the criteria of 
Russian-ness—language, race, a very particular version of history, 
Orthodoxy and territorial ambition—the sole way of interpreting the 
world.” George Schopflin, “Russia's reinvented empire,” March 5, 
2007, <www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_govern- 
ment/russia_empire_4589.jsp>. See also Elfie Siegl, “Von Stalins Sieg 
zum Sieg Putins. Der Kreml und sein Geschichtsbild,” Russlandanaly- 
sen, November 9, 2007, nr. 148, pp. 2-4.
25. Charles Clover, “Invasion's Ideologues,” Financial Times, 
September 9, 2008, p. 9.
26. “Otvety na voprosy zhurnalistov po okonchanii peregovorov s 
Federal'nym kantslerom Germanii Angeloi Merkel',” March 8, 2008, 
<president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/03/161952.shtml>.
27. See Catharine Nepomnyashchy, “Man in Black: Putin and the 
Power of the Image,” Unpublished paper.
28. This video may be viewed on www.russia.ru/putin/.
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Putin as the quintessence of virility and a man's 
man, but it is quite open in targeting the youngish 
female voter to whom, apparently, Putin's 
“political technologists” believed such gendered 
representations of masculinity would necessarily 
appeal.29
• Widespread popular support: Like Mussolini and 
Hitler, Putin enjoys enormous popular appeal.30 
Despite the many ups and downs of his years in office, 
Russians have consistently supported him to the tune 
of 70-plus percent. Like Hitler and Mussolini, Putin 
has restored law, order, and stability—or at least the 
semblance thereof.31 Far more important, Putin has 
also restored Russians' pride in themselves, their 
present, and their past—in part by rehabilitating 
Stalin—and given Russians hope in their future. 
And like Hitler and Mussolini, Putin claims to be 
fulfilling nothing more than the people's mandate.32
29Note in this light Mussolini's claim, “Fascism desires an active man, 
one engaged in activity with all his energies: it desires a man virilely 
conscious of the difficulties that exist in action and ready to face 
them.” Adrian Lyttleton, ed., Italian Fascisms: From Pareto to Gentile 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 40.
30. One Russian historian who compared Putin with Hitler in a 
December 2007 article entitled “Putin—Our Good Hitler” became the 
object of official investigation. See <http://www.kommersant.ru/ 
region/perm/page.htm?year=2008&issue=27&id=247780&secti
on=7272>.
31. See David Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution: Class and 
Status in Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1980).
32. Consider the following exchange, from Putin's December 12, 2007 
interview with Time magazine:
QUESTION: You have spoken very confidently about Russia's role in 
international affairs. People say that it was harder to carry out this poli-
cy at the start of your presidency, but now that you have become a very 
strong president, I want to ask you: when did you become a national 
leader? What determines this position? When were you able to say to 
yourself, “Yes, now I have become a true leader”?
VLADIMIR PUTIN: First of all, this is something I never thought 
about, just as I never thought that I would one day be President. And 
now, to be honest, I try not to think about it because I think that when 
people start to think they are somehow exceptional, some kind of 
exceptional leader, they start to lose touch with reality.
I never called myself a national leader. It is others who have called me 
this. I did not think up this term and have never sought it. When I 
became President the country found itself unwillingly plunged into the 
chaos of civil war in the Caucasus and faced enormous economic 
difficulties, the collapse of the social sphere and a huge number of 
people living below the poverty line.
I can say to you with all certainty that I did not just take this job, step 
into this office, as it were, but I decided for myself that I was ready to 
do everything I could, to make any sacrifice, in order to restore the 
country. I made this the main purpose of my life and I decided that my 
own life in the broad sense, my personal life and interests, therefore 
ended.
Destiny has given me the chance to play a positive role in the history 
of my people, and I see myself as a part of this people and feel very 
strongly my connection to them. I have always felt this and I feel it 
now, and from the moment I made my decision I have subjugated my 
entire life to this goal.
I think that these goals have been reached to a large extent. We now
The following quotation, from Putin's last press 
conference as president in February 2008, is an excellent 
example of his discourse of statism, hyper-nationalism, 
cult of personality, and popular support and needs 
no commentary. According to the Financial Times 
correspondent, Putin “poured scorn on speculation in the 
western press that he had built up an enormous personal 
fortune while in power, saying the reports had been 
‘picked out of their noses and then smeared all over the 
papers.' He said: ‘I am the richest person not only in 
Europe but also in the world. I collect emotions. And I 
am rich because the Russian people twice entrusted me 
with the leadership of such a great country as Russia. I 
think this is my greatest fortune.'”33
Is, then, Putin's Russia fascist? As this checklist 
suggests, Russia is rather more than a simple authoritarian 
state. Some scholars have tried to capture this difference 
by employing such terms as patrimonial or tsarist. Anne 
Applebaum speaks of “Putinism.”34 Although these terms 
are fine as descriptive designations, they fail to locate 
today's Russia on a spectrum of political systems and, 
thus, to convey the magnitude of the changes wrought by 
Putin. I suggest that the term fascism can therefore tell us 
just how much, as well as the direction in which, Russia 
has changed.
To be sure, although Putin's Russia possesses many 
of the defining characteristics of fascism, it does so only 
to a greater or lesser extent. Having emerged haphazardly 
only in the last few years, these characteristics have 
not yet assumed the form of a consolidated political 
system; nor is it clear that they are here to stay. In that 
sense, Russia today resembles Germany in 1933 or 
Italy in the early-to-mid-1920s. Russia could follow in 
their footsteps, or it could falter and find its way back 
to some form of democracy or authoritarianism. Located 
somewhere between authoritarianism and fascism, 
today's Russia may therefore be termed fascistoid. If the 
system remains as is, or even hardens during Medvedev's 
presidency, then one will be able to say that Russia has 
moved even further toward a full-fledged fascism. If the 
system breaks down, or undergoes significant change in 
the direction of democracy or authoritarianism, then the
have other problems, just as big, that we must address, but these are 
already problems of a different kind, and we have every opportunity 
for making progress.
So when you ask me when I first had this feeling of being a leader, I 
can say that I haven't had this feeling and I don't have it now. I feel 
like a work horse that is hauling along a cart filled with a heavy load, 
and I can tell you that the satisfaction I feel from my work depends on 
how rapidly and effectively I manage to make progress along this road. 
< http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/12/19/1618_
type82916_154779.shtml>.
33. Catherine Belton, “Putin maps out strategy to retain powerful 
role,” Financial Times, February 14, 2008, p. 4.
34. Anne Applebaum, “Putinism: Democracy, the Russian Way,” The 
Berlin Journal, spring 2008, no. 16, pp. 43-47.
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transition toward fascism will have proven unsuccessful. 
For the first few months of Medvedev's tenure, the 
verdict seemed unclear, as both he and Prime Minister 
Putin appeared to be jockeying for power. The August 
war against Georgia saw Putin return to prominence—in 
exactly the kind of hyper-masculine role he had crafted 
as president—and suggested that Russia was moving 
toward fascism.35 Medvedev's “Go, Russia!” article of 
September 2009, on the other hand, seemed to suggest 
that he was pushing back and that a return toward simple 
authoritarianism might still be possible.36 In sum, Russia 
remains mired in the fascistoid no-man's land between 
authoritarianism and fascism. And it may stay there until 
the next presidential elections. If, at that point, Putin runs 
and wins, the verdict should be clearer.
Theoretical Approaches to Systemic 
Change
One may explain Russia's, or any country's, 
systemic transformations as the product of 1) political 
culture, 2) structural or institutional forces, or 3) elite 
decisions—with the first two approaches reflecting 
“structure” and the third reflecting “agency” in the 
structure vs. agency debate. Cultural explanations that 
assume the persistence of cultural norms, attitudes, or 
discourses are best at explaining systemic continuities or 
reversions to past forms; they are generally weak when 
it comes to explaining breaks with the past. Structural 
and institutional explanations can explain persistence 
and change, but they cannot account for timing. Elite 
explanations can explain persistence, change, and timing, 
but in being able to account for everything, they easily 
run the risk of being trivially true.
In explaining the shift from totalitarianism to 
authoritarianism, a cultural explanation would focus on 
the growing gap that developed in the last two decades of 
Leonid Brezhnev's rule between official Soviet ideology, 
discourse, and norms on the one hand and popular 
ideology, discourse, and norms on the other. Such an 
explanation would then emphasize how the notion of 
systemic failure was “constructed” by opposition elites— 
in particular the non-Russian popular fronts that emerged 
during perestroika37—who managed to delegitimize the
35. See Stephen Blank, “Russia's War on Georgia: The Domestic 
Conflict,” Perspective, October 2008, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 1-5.
According to Blank, “Apart from the enshrinement of a condition of 
permanent threat and the predisposition to adventurism, the other 
domestic context of this invasion is the extension of Putin's primacy. 
Even if we concede that the war's motives and origins lie largely in the 
realm of geopolitical considerations, it is clear that it has served to 
extend Putin's leadership.”
36. Dmitrii Medvedev, “Rossiya, vpered!” September 10, 2009. 
<http://news.kremlin.ru/news/5413>
37. See Thomas Sherlock, Historical Narratives in the Soviet Union
and Post-Soviet Russia (New York: Palgrave, 2007). .
authorities, mobilize their own discursive constituencies, 
and create systemic collapse. A cultural explanation 
would then emphasize the emergence of a democratic 
discourse of popular sovereignty in the late-perestroika 
years, Yeltsin's appropriation of democratic rhetoric in 
the aftermath of the failed August 1991 coup, and the 
resultant discursive momentum toward a democratic 
form of government. Seen in this light, democracy 
could never really have taken hold because, despite the 
temporary emergence of a democratic discourse, Russian 
political culture, as it developed in the course of hundreds 
of years, is non-democratic and imperial and Russians 
like strong rule by strong men—a point the Marquis de 
Custine would probably have endorsed.38 The drift away 
from democracy was therefore inevitable. Russians 
were therefore grateful to Putin for having restored both 
stability, which they supposedly value above all else, and 
their sense of pride, in themselves and in their formerly 
humiliated country, great Mother Russia.
In explaining the shift from totalitarianism to 
authoritarianism, a structural/institutional explanation 
would focus on the internal systemic contradictions 
and inefficiencies of totalitarianism and argue that 
totalitarianism was fated, as in Karl Marx's understanding 
of capitalism, to collapse.39 That it collapsed at the time 
it did was due to Gorbachev's institutionally induced 
inability to appreciate—indeed, to see—the importance 
to the USSR's stability of the nationality factor and 
unwillingness to stop perestroika from eviscerating the 
Soviet body politic. A structural/institutional explanation 
would then highlight the collapse of the Communist Party, 
as an all-embracing institution that defined the nature of 
the political system, and its replacement by a plethora of 
parties, movements, and groupings that began competing 
for power in a manner that approximated competition 
and democracy. Finally, democracy had to fail from this 
perspective because the construction of stable democratic 
institutions was incompatible with Russia's inheritance 
of the institutional legacies of totalitarian and imperial 
collapse.
An elite explanation of the shift from totalitarianism to 
authoritarianism would focus on Gorbachev's decisions, 
first, to implement glasnost and perestroika and, second, 
not to rein them in once disintegrative processes had been 
unleashed. The rise of Yeltsin as president of Russia and 
the emergence with him of a counterforce to Gorbachev, 
the gradual transformation of the Communist bosses of 
the non-Russian republics into national Communists 
supporting sovereignty and then independence, and the
38. See also Edward Keenan, “Muscovite Political Folkways,” Russian
Review, vol. 45, 1986, pp. 158-181.
39. For a structural argument along these lines, see Alexander J. Motyl,
Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
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inability of Gorbachev to meet the challenge they posed 
to him and his authority would round out the picture 
through 1991. Yeltsin's ability to outflank his opponents 
by employing force against the recalcitrant parliament in 
late 1993, his decision to hold more or less fair and free 
presidential elections in 1996, tolerate party competition, 
and refrain from pursuing unlimited presidential power 
would be the key factors behind the emergence in the 
1990s of a weak form of democracy. Finally, an elite 
explanation would focus on Putin the ex-KGB officer 
who packed the ruling elites with his allies from among 
the siloviki, emasculated the regions, and progressively 
dismantled the country's democratic structures and 
replaced them with fascist-like ones.40
Although these approaches are different, the fact 
that they all do an adequate job of explaining Russia's 
systemic transformations suggests, first, that Russia's 
move toward fascism may have been over-determined 
and, second, that we may therefore employ all three in 
explaining Russia's fall from totalitarianism and drift 
through authoritarianism and democracy toward fascism. 
The next section will attempt to craft a coherent account 
of Russia's systemic transformations that draws on all 
three approaches within a framework that employs two 
key concepts—totalitarianism and empire.
Explaining Russian Exceptionalism
Russia's exceptional trajectory—from totalitarianism 
to authoritarianism to democracy to fascism—is the 
result of its exceptional status within the Soviet system 
of rule. In contrast to all the other post-Communist states, 
Russia was the core of both the totalitarian system and the 
Soviet empire. That is, although the Russian population 
suffered enormously from the misrule of the Communist 
Party, the Soviet secret police, and their leaders, the 
institutions that ran the totalitarian and imperial systems 
were lodged in Russia, were run by Russian cadres, and 
employed Russian language and culture as instruments 
of rule. Russians also viewed these institutions and the 
Soviet state and empire as fundamentally theirs.
The collapse of totalitarianism and empire thus had 
different implications for non-Russians and Russians. 
First, collapse meant expanded freedom for all the 
peoples of the former Soviet empire, but for Russians it 
also, if not primarily, meant strategic defeat and intense 
national humiliation.41 *Second, while collapse forced non- 
Russians to embark on ideologically legitimated positive 
projects of nation- and state-building, it forced Russians
40. See Andrew Jack, Inside Putin's Russia (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004).
41. See Alexander J. Motyl, “Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial
Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective,” 
Comparative Politics, vol. 31, no. 2, January 1999, pp. 127-145.
to salvage what remained of a superpower and great state. 
Third, collapse bequeathed weak and underdeveloped 
institutions and armies to the formerly Soviet non-Russian 
states in the “near abroad,” and relatively coherent, 
experienced, and well-staffed governing institutions, a 
secret police, and a powerful army to the Russians.
In other words, collapse stacked the cards against 
democracy in Russia. The population, whose political 
culture was anti-democratic to start with, viewed nation-
building as being primarily about reestablishing its lost 
position of glory as a “great people” and state-building as 
being primarily about reestablishing the “great Russian 
state.” No other population in the former Soviet space was 
encumbered with such a mind-set. Worse, the Russian 
Federation inherited the very institutions—still powerful 
central ministries and a strong and powerful secret police 
and army—that were least inclined to support democratic 
projects. Further complicating things was the economic 
collapse and breakdown in law and order that afflicted 
Russia and every other post-Communist state in the 
1990s. All elites and populations in all the states had to 
cope with the resulting disorder and many were tempted 
to adopt or prolong authoritarian solutions, but only in 
Russia did this time of troubles become transformed into 
a discursive mantra that blamed democracy for all of 
Russia's ills and seemed to justify a widespread systemic 
transformation toward dictatorial rule.
Putin's ability to assume power in 1999-2000, to 
consolidate his rule quickly, and to attain the status of 
a popular “national leader” therefore had as much to 
do with the condition of post-Soviet Russia as with any 
personal talents he may have possessed. Putin the career 
KGB officer represented the ideal “man on horseback” 
who would end the besporyadok and khaos (disorder 
and chaos) that was created by the collapse of empire 
and totalitarianism and that was so repugnant to an 
authoritarian political culture. That same background also 
provided him with invaluable contacts with the already 
large percentage of siloviki who had managed to infiltrate 
the establishment in the 1990s. Unlike Mussolini and 
Hitler, Putin was an insider who neither had to march 
on the capital nor wage street battles and sit in jail. And 
because Putin emerged from within the system, he did not 
need—or have—a full-fledged ideological program for 
storming the citadels of power. Instead, he could proceed 
to construct a fascistoid state without declaring that he 
would do so—and, perhaps, without even knowing that 
he would do so.
Unsurprisingly, post-Soviet Russia's developmental 
path resembles that of post-World War I Germany. 
Both countries lost empires and experienced profound 
humiliation. Both countries then experienced extreme 
economic hardship under the stewardship of weak and 
corrupt democratic regimes. Both countries blamed
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democracy and its internal and external supporters for 
their ills. Both countries turned to hyper-nationalism, 
state fetishization, and strong-man rule. In both countries 
strong men seized power—by legitimate means, by the 
way—and exploited popular willingness to submit to 
domination to establish their dictatorial rule. Seen in 
this light, fascism, pace Marxist theories thereof, is not 
so much the product of the “crisis of capitalism,” as of 
the “crisis of democracy” in weakened and humiliated 
states with nondemocratic political cultures. Linz's 
explanation of inter-war fascism is strikingly relevant 
to post-Soviet Russia: “Fascism was the novel response 
to the crisis—profound or temporary—of the pre-war 
social structure and party system and to the emergence 
of new institutional arrangements as a result of war and 
post-war dislocations. It would be particularly acute in 
defeated nations, in those which were divided about entry 
into the war and disappointed with the fruits of victory, 
such as Italy, and those countries where the crisis led to 
unsuccessful revolutionary attempts. Fascism would be 
a counter-revolutionary response led by a revolutionary 
elite.”42
Challenges for Fascistoid Russia
Although totalitarianism decays in the long run, 
it tends to be stable in the short to medium term, as all 
its components reinforce total control—until they do 
not, at which point the slide toward breakdown may be 
inevitable. Authoritarian systems are stable as long as they 
can repress populations—which becomes increasingly 
hard to do over time, as the costs of repression mount and 
revenues usually decline. Democracies may be the most 
stable, especially in the long term, as they are generally 
able to enjoy some degree of popular support, minimize 
the costs of compliance, and promote economic growth. 
Fascism may be least stable in the short, medium, and long 
terms, generating three contradictions, or weaknesses, 
relating to the supreme leader, the willingness of the 
population to obey, and the effect of fascist rhetoric and 
behavior on neighboring states.
(1) Cults of vigorous leaders cannot be sustained 
as leaders inevitably grow old or decrepit. A continual 
rejuvenation of the supreme leader might solve the 
problem were it not for the fact that fascist leaders do 
not want to give up power. Sooner or later, fascist leaders 
lose their core legitimacy, and when they do, both their 
followers and the submissive population begin to look 
for alternative idols. Putin, although young and vigorous 
today, will not remain young forever. And an old and 
decrepit Russian leader will not be able to make the case 
for youth, vigor, and manliness in typical fascist style.
42. Linz, p. 7.
Moreover, fascist regimes are invariably fragmented. 
Extreme centralization of power in a supreme leader is 
supposed to ensure elite coordination and submission; 
instead, it inclines elites to compete for the leader's favor, 
to amass resources and build regional or bureaucratic 
empires, and not to cooperate with their colleagues- 
turned-competitors. Fascist regimes are thus brittle, and 
when supreme leaders falter—as they inevitably do, 
especially during times of crisis—or leave the scene, 
successor elites engage in cutthroat competition to 
assume the mantle of authority. In so doing, however, 
they not only weaken the regime, but they also expose 
the system as less than the imposing monolith projected 
to the submissive population.
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and its impact 
on Russia's banks, oligarchs, stock market, energy, and 
growth prospects are likely to intensify elite infighting and 
erode Putin's aura of omnipotence, especially if popular 
living standards begin to decline. The next few years will 
be particularly difficult for Russia, as Putin tries to remain 
in control of a political system formally led by Medvedev 
without becoming the target of popular opprobrium and 
elite opposition. Chances are that Putin will attempt 
to shift the blame onto Medvedev, present himself as 
Russia's only hope, and manipulate elites and publics to 
force Medvedev to resign—just as the economy is about 
to improve. Of course, Putin could fail. The siloviki and 
other elites may turn against him and the public may 
tire of his play-acting—especially if the economic crisis 
proves deeper and longer-lasting. Whatever the outcome, 
Russian politics will be exceedingly unsettled. And 
regardless of who leads the government, these tensions 
and uncertainties will undermine the effectiveness of the 
system and its capacity to retain popular support.43
(2) Popular humiliation and the willingness to 
submit to unconditional authority are weak foundations 
on which to build states. Sooner or later, Russians will 
not feel humiliated and, when that happens—as it surely 
will, once their prosperity and exposure to the world and 
its blandishment increases—they will be less inclined 
to accept leader cults and authoritarian rule by shadowy 
siloviki. To be sure, Russian political culture may be 
authoritarian, and, as such, it will sustain fascism. But 
strategic sectors of Russia society—the middle class and 
students—will increasingly reject that culture and prove 
to be a source of new thinking about Russia's politics.
The rise of a middle class committed to private 
property, rule of law, and greater involvement in the 
political process is an obvious challenge to the longer- 
term stability of a fascist state. Even if official elites
43. See James Sherr, “Russia and the West: A Reassessment,” Defence 
Academy of the United Kingdom, The Shrivenham Papers, no. 6, 
January 2008, p. 19.
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succeed in converting affluent and educated Russians to 
hyper-nationalism and neo-imperialism—as many elites 
have done in the past—a middle class could force the 
state to make concessions to its preferences and, over 
time, evolve into a milder form of authoritarian rule. 
The middle class could come to play a more directly 
destabilizing rule in times of political or economic crisis, 
especially during periods of intense elite infighting. 
Ukraine's more affluent citizens threw in their lot with 
the Orange revolutionaries in late 2004 and, by providing 
them with material support, were able to ensure their 
victory. Russia's affluent citizens could just as easily 
follow in the Ukrainians' footsteps, if conditions appear 
to favor their interests—as they just might if the financial 
collapse of 2008 has severe repercussions and the elites 
appear incapable of finding quick and painless solutions.
Students are the traditional bearers of revolution in 
almost all societies, and it is at first glance remarkable 
that Russia's many students have thus far been quiet. 
Like Americans and Europeans in the 1950s, they may 
be responding to past economic insecurity and current 
economic prospects by focusing on their educations 
and careers. But, like their American and European 
counterparts in the 1960s, they may, once a certain degree 
of prosperity can be taken for granted while politics 
remains nondemocratic, have the self-assurance to 
translate their critical thinking and youthful enthusiasm 
into protest. On their own, students in developed societies 
are rarely able to do more than cause trouble. If their 
rebellions coincide with or feed off larger social unrest, 
economic crisis, and political infighting, however, the 
potential for instability can grow correspondingly.
(3) All fascist states scare their neighbors and 
provoke them to defend themselves against perceived 
threats emanating from the behavior and bluster of fascist 
leaders. In that sense, fascist hyper-nationalism becomes 
a self-ful fi lling prophecy—effectively creating the very 
enemies it invokes as the reasons for its justification. 
The soldiers and policemen who run fascist states have a 
natural proclivity to toughness and weaponry. The hyper-
nationalism, state fetishes, and cult of hyper-masculinity 
incline fascist states to see enemies everywhere. The 
cult-like status of leaders encourages them to pound their 
chests with abandon. And the population's implication in 
its own repression leads it to balance its self-humiliation 
with attempts to humiliate others. Unsurprisingly, Russia 
has taken to asserting its “rightful” place in the sun by
engaging in energy blackmail vis-a-vis Ukraine, Belarus,
and the Baltic states, cyber-wars against Estonia, a war
against Georgia, Polar land grabs, saber-rattling in the 
Crimea, and other forms of aggressive behavior.
Russia will create ever more suspicious and 
terrified neighbors the longer it remains fascistoid.
Those neighbors—in particular Ukraine, Belarus, 
Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan—will 
not just roll over and accept a fait accompli crafted in 
Moscow. Instead, they will seek existential solutions to 
existential threats. At a minimum, this means beefing up 
substantially their defense expenditures, crafting anti-
Russian alliances, subordinating economic reform to the 
exigencies of security, and viewing their own Russian-
speaking populations as potential fifth columns. More 
likely than not, the non-Russian states that feel most 
threatened by Russia will follow in Israel's footsteps 
and seek security guarantees from the United States 
and shelter under the American nuclear umbrella. At a 
maximum, this means doing exactly what the Israelis 
have done: secretly acquiring nuclear weapons. All the 
ex-Soviet states have the know-how to build nuclear 
reactors and weapons; Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan 
even inherited hundreds of warheads after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. And some of their leaders have openly 
expressed regret at having transferred them to Russia in 
the early 1990s.
Naturally, these defensive reactions will only succeed 
in persuading Russia's ruling elites that continued power 
enhancement is imperative, both in defense of the 
fatherland and in defense of their “abandoned brethren” 
in the non-Russian states. A “quick, little war” might then 
become tempting, as a means of rallying the population 
around the flag, of distracting attention from economic 
woes, and of teaching the non-Russians a lesson. Crisis 
and overreach will then become likely—especially as 
Russia is far weaker than its elites believe44—and the 
resulting foreign-policy disasters will serve to expose 
the regime and leader as less than all-knowing and all-
competent and thereby accelerate elite fragmentation and 
popular dissatisfaction.45
The End of Fascistoid Russia
Russia faces an additional problem—one peculiar 
to its economy. Because energy resources have fueled 
Russia's economic development, the centrality of 
energy and, thus, of easy money will transform, and 
perhaps already has transformed, Russia into a “petro-
state” that already serves as an impediment to further 
economic development and political stability. Energy-
generated easy money encourages state elites to engage 
in corruption and outright theft and to use the state as a 
source of patronage. Easy money therefore promotes a
44. See Allen C. Lynch, How Russia Is Not Ruled (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Rajan Menon and Alexander J. 
Motyl, “The Myth of Russian Resurgence,” The American Interest, 
vol. 2, no. 4, March/April 2007, pp. 96-101
45. On overreach, see Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of 
Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); Jack Snyder, 
Myths of Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).
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bloated and parasitic state apparatus whose efficiency and 
effectiveness decline as lines of command become blurred, 
elites engage in localized empire building, resources are 
diverted from their intended uses, and corruption gets 
out of control. Elite fragmentation weakens the supreme 
leader, while untrammeled rent-seeking both undercuts 
the persuasiveness of statist ideology and impedes 
the development of the middle class. Easy money also 
encourages elites to engage in saber-rattling vis-a-vis 
their neighbors.
The 2008-2009 economic crisis will both enhance 
these tendencies and create debilitating contradictions. 
On the one hand, capital flight, declining foreign direct 
investment, and the drop in energy prices will reduce the 
ability of the petro-state to generate easy money. On the 
other hand, growing state intervention in a crisis-ridden 
economy will inevitably increase corruption and promote 
further elite infighting, both over policy and over the 
shrinking pie. In sum, a fascistoid Russia faces the risk of 
decay, and perhaps even breakdown, in the not too distant 
future.
Which way will a destabilized Russia go— 
toward democracy or toward authoritarianism? A 
cultural approach to systemic change would suggest 
that authoritarianism, as being more in sync with an
authoritarian political culture, is more likely. A structural/ 
institutional approach would probably come down on 
the side of some messy form of democracy as the most 
likely aftermath of the supreme leader's fall from power 
and the concomitant elite infighting. An elite approach 
could go either way, especially as Putin's opponents can 
be found among both the democratic opposition and the 
hard-line siloviki. If these calculations are correct, then 
the most one can say with any degree of confidence is 
that a post-fascist Russia will probably enter an extended 
time of troubles characterized by different forces pulling 
it in different directions—both toward and away from 
democracy. The only thing that seems certain is that, 
as besporyadok and khaos increase, Russians will curse 
Putin for their misfortunes.
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